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With the current bicentennial celebrating the Constitution as
the nation's greatest political success story, it may seem a little
unpatriotic to write about three authors who judged it, if not a
failure, something less than a fulfillment. Charles Beard, Hannah
Arendt, and Louis Hartz had some perceptive things to say about
what had happened in Philadelphia in 1787, and each concluded
that the American founding was ill-founded. Even though all three
admired the framers, each had reasons for believing things would
have been better had the framers thought differently about liberty
and power. And each scholar read into the American past his or
her own ideological predilections. With Beard it was class realities,
with Arendt classical ideals, and with Hartz deeper consensual
structures. Thus, each author had different reasons for being am-
bivalent about the Constitution.
Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution re-
mains one of the most provocative and controversial books ever
written by an American historian. Prior to Beard's Progressive era
the Constitution's authority rested on the assumption that it was a
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neutral document rendering objective judgments based on either
transcendent religious principles or secular doctrines like natural
law. Although later generations enshrined the Constitution as a
semi-divine document, the framers described it as deriving not
from abstract theory but from a history of human experience with
political power, economic interests, and social relations. The fram-
ers, in short, were not idealists who sought to judge history from
some standard external to history itself. Instead, they were realists
who viewed the issues of history as reducible to questions of power
and how to control it. Why, then, did Beard not esteem their Con-
stitution as worthy of the status of genuine authority? Clearly the
document was grounded in the reality of everyday experience,
which for pragmatists, as well as Marxists, is the criterion of truth.
What was Beard's quarrel with the Constitution?
Basically there are three dimensions to Beard's thesis: (a) the
economic, involving the monetary and property interests at stake
in framing the Constitution; (b) the political, involving the proce-
dure by which the Constitution was adopted and power relocated
in the new federal government; and (c) the intellectual, involving
the use of ideas to explain and justify the new Constitution in or-
der to legitimate it and persuade the people to accept its authority.
The Constitution, Beard argued, was essentially an "economic
document." Rather than being drafted by high-minded men dedi-
cated to such abstract ideals as "justice," "liberty," and "the pur-
suit of happiness"-the conventional wisdom-the Constitution
was devised by consolidated economic groups who had dealt in
money, public securities, manufacturing, or trade and shipping.
These groups played a decisive role in the decision to scuttle the
older Articles of Confederation. Moreover, they dominated the rat-
ifying conventions in the states.
The opposition to the Constitution consisted of small farmers
and debtors whose meager resources were tied to land and whose
interests and demands had been effectively reflected under the
Confederation. Having obtained control of currency and commerce
in the states, the anti-Federalists claimed that those who wanted
to transfer such powers to the new federal government under the
proposed Constitution were aristocrats attempting to establish
government to benefit only the wealthy few.
Politically the Constitution represented an extra-legal coup
d'etat. Democratic mythology depicted the Constitution as pro-
ceeding "from the whole people; the people are the original source
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of all political authority exercised under it." 1 But the new govern-
ment, according to Beard, was actually put over by undemocratic
means and imposed on a society where democracy had yet to be
born. Property qualifications for voting and office holding excluded
"a large propertyless mass," and hence probably not more than
one-sixth of the adult male population ratified the Constitution,
and in five states it was questionable whether a majority of voters
even approved of ratification. The unenfranchised and unrepre-
sented small farmers and debtors thus lost power under the new
system, not only because they had no effective voice in the out-
come of the debates, but also because the new centralized govern-
ment now possessed the economic liberties the states once enjoyed,
specifically the right to print money and dissolve contract obliga-
tions. Hence, the Constitution dramatized "the concept that the
fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government
and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities."2
An economic movement and a political maneuver required an
intellectual rationale, an ideological function that James Madison
fulfilled with consummate skill. Beard emphasized that his book
derived not only from archival research into the Treasury Depart-
ment but also from a close reading of Madison's political philoso-
phy in the Federalist, especially paper number 10. That key docu-
ment, a "masterly statement of the theory of economic
determinism,"' offered an analysis of why the unequal division of
property leads to "class" and "group" divisions and why politics
and law "inevitably" reflect these contending interests. Madison
made the control and regulation of these "factions" the "first ob-
ject" of government." The Constitution was designed not to fulfill
the egalitarian principles of the Declaration of Independence but
to regulate conflict through a maze of checks and balances among
the departments of government and a division of powers between
the federal government and the states.5
When Beard's Economic Interpretation first appeared in 1913,
the academic response was on the whole "quite favorable," but
non-academics greeted it with howls of outrage.6 The more discern-
1 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States 10 (1935).
2 Id. at 324-25.
3 Id. at 15.
" Federalist 10, in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 77, 78 (1961).
5 Beard, Economic Interpretation at 15-16 (cited in note 1).
' Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington 212
(1968).
19881
The University of Chicago Law Review
ing scholars, like Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr., responded to Beard's
thesis with almost a yawn. Holmes took for granted economic in-
terest in all political activity, and he saw law as little more than its
implementation through force. However, reaction changed over
time. Some years later Walter Lippmann responded implicitly to
the Beard thesis by observing that the framers, rather than creat-
ing the Constitution to protect property, used their "class privi-
leges" to preserve their country. In more recent times, historians
have challenged Beard's thesis by arguing that the conflict between
the Federalists and anti-Federalists was not a class struggle but a
division between provincial farmers and cosmopolitan merchants,
that the framers may have desired to control democracy yet still
affirmed that government rests on the consent of the governed, and
that they were primarily interested in unionism and a strong na-
tion state. Nevertheless, a number of Beardian arguments remain
that are less easy to refute: (a) that liberty and property were in
conflict to the extent that the Constitution was designed to protect
minority interests from popular majorities-which Madison de-
scribed as "overbearing;" (b) that Madison was indeed an eco-
nomic determinist and that he, Hamilton, and John Adams did see
in the formation of "factions" an expression of class struggle be-
tween the many and the few; and, therefore, (c) that the Constitu-
tion did violate, at least implicitly, the Declaration to the extent
that the older Lockean principle of the will of the majority was not
to be allowed to express itself collectively through political means.'
Whether or not Beard's arguments are valid, he did not come
to hate the proponents of the Constitution and love its opponents.
Although the Progressive school of history associated with Vernon
L. Parrington tended to identify Beard as a Jeffersonian who es-
teemed the anti-Federalists as genuine democrats dedicated to po-
litical ideals rather than economic interests, Beard saw the anti-
Federalists as motivated by property concerns as much as the Fed-
eralists. Moreover, he ridiculed Jefferson's idolization of "the peo-
ple" and refused to worship the Declaration as sacrosanct. He also
challenged the Progressive criticism of judicial review and believed
that the Supreme Court provided a vital check on democratic state
legislatures. in addition, he admired the Federalists for recognizing
the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation; and in The Eco-
7 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion 280 (1922).
8 See John Patrick Diggins, Power and Authority in American History: The Case of
Charles A. Beard and His Critics, 86 Am.Hist.Rev. 701, 713 (1981).
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nomic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy9 and elsewhere, he
praised the political insights of John Adams and the economic
foresights of Alexander Hamilton.1 °
Beard's quarrel was not with the framers, who had a firm
grasp of the "conflicts of economic interests" surrounding the Con-
stitution's ratification, a point he made in his 1935 "Introduction"
to An Economic Interpretation."' His quarrel was directed at nine-
teenth century historians who had sanctified the Constitution by
hailing the triumph of supposedly high-minded nationalists over
the "narrow" advocates of state rights. But if Beard admired the
Federalists as intellectuals, he retained a sentimental nostalgia for
the anti-Federalists. Sometimes he depicted the Constitution's op-
ponents as forerunners of late nineteenth century populists. Beard
described the anti-Federalist author "Centinel" as "the warmest
advocate of the initiative and referendum in our time.'1 2 "Under
the Articles of Confederation populism had a free hand, for majori-
ties in the state legislatures were omnipotent." 3 Long after he had
written An Economic Interpretation, Beard continued to regard
the state legislatures of the Revolutionary era as animated by an
advanced agrarian radicalism. The Revolution made "the local leg-
islatures, in which farmers had the majorities, supreme over all
things," and there "the leveling tendencies" reflected the egalita-
rian spirit of the Declaration. 4 It could be said that for Beard the
Constitution did more to flout the Revolution than to fulfill it.
Hannah Arendt's reasoning about the Revolution and Consti-
tution is somewhat similar yet far more complex and ambiguous.
"Paradoxical as it may sound," she wrote in On Revolution, "it was
in fact under the impact of the Revolution that the revolutionary
spirit in this country began to wither away, and it was the Consti-
tution itself, this greatest achievement of the American people,
which eventually cheated them of their proudest possession."' 5
How could the American people both incorporate the revolutionary
I Charles A. Beard, The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy 299-321 (on John
Adams), 112-131 (on Alexander Hamilton) (1952).
10 See the valuable reinterpretation by Pope McCorkele, The Historian as Intellectual:
Charles Beard and the Constitution Reconsidered, 28 Am.J.Leg.Hist. 314, especially at 321-
41 (1984).
11 Beard, Economic Interpretation at vii (cited in note 1).
12 Id. at 313.
13 Charles A. Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution 88 (1962).
" Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, 1 The Rise of American Civilization 299, 307
(1927).
15 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 242 (1963). Page references in this and subsequent
notes are to the original edition, rather than to the newly issued Pelican reprint.
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spirit into the Constitution and then allow it to become their "lost
treasure"?
Arendt mentions Beard only once in On Revolution, primarily
to chide American historians for trying to unmask the founders as
hypocrites who spoke the language of liberty while proceeding to
defend property. 16 In contrast to Progressive historians, Arendt
avoids dramatizing the alleged discrepancy between the liberty-ori-
ented Declaration and the property-oriented Constitution, and she
denies that what took place at the Philadelphia Convention was a
"counter-revolution." Both the idea of liberty and the idea of
property pertain to individuals, and Arendt is primarily concerned
with power, which she views as a collective phenomenon that
"comes into being only if and when men join themselves together
for the purpose of action."' 7 After the Revolution, when the au-
thority of the Crown and Parliament had been abolished, there de-
veloped something of a power vacuum in the colonies, and the aim
of various state legislatures in writing new constitutions was to cre-
ate new centers of power. So far, so good. But why did it become
necessary to take power from the state legislatures and relocate it
in the new federal government proposed by the Constitution?
Curiously, Arendt says very little about the social and eco-
nomic tensions that erupted during the period between the
Revolution and the Constitution that some historians refer to as
"the critical era." The tariff barriers among the states and their
non-interchangeable currency systems, the growing antagonisms
between urban creditors and rural debtors who tried to pay off
their loans by forcing the respective legislatures to issue more
money, the armed uprising of desperate farmers in western Massa-
chusetts-the very problems and events that worried Adams,
Madison, and Washington-gave Arendt little cause for concern.
Perhaps this was because Arendt had already attributed the suc-
cess of the Revolution to the claim that America, unlike France
and other countries, did not have to address "the social question,"
that is, the issue of poverty and misery-the solution to which pre-
sumably caused other revolutions to escalate beyond their original
goals and in the process destroy their original ideals. 8 Whether or
not the American Revolution was strictly a political event that did
not have to address the social question, Arendt explains the Con-
stitution not through an historian's description of tensions but
16 Id. at 94-95.
17 Id. at 174.
Is Id. at 62-63.
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through a philosopher's definition of terms.
Unlike Beard and even some contemporary "neo-progressive"
historians such as Gary Nash and, in some respects, Gordon Wood,
Arendt views the Constitution as "the true culmination of this rev-
olutionary process." Those who see the Constitution as a product
of the "forces of reaction" fail to see the inherent logic of a revolu-
tion. "The basic misunderstanding lies in the failure to distinguish
between liberation and freedom; there is nothing more futile than
rebellion and liberation unless they are followed by the constitu-
tion of the newly won freedom."1 While rebellion aims toward lib-
eration, the end of revolution must be the foundation of freedom.
In rebelling against England the colonists sought to eliminate an
alien government, but after the Revolution the question of power
still remained. "When they declared their independence from this
government, and after they had forsworn their allegiance to the
crown, the main question for them certainly was not how to limit
power but how to establish it, not how to limit government but
how to found a new one."20 The founders drew upon Montesquieu
for theories on the separation of the branches of the government in
order to secure freedom by dispersing power. And freedom is es-
tablished by allowing power to be augmented and arrested at the
same time, that is, deposited in the new central government where
it can be both exercised and controlled. Arendt quotes Adam's dic-
tum that "power must be opposed to power, force to force,
strength to strength" in order to make the point that the Federal-
ists were not trying to centralize all power in the new govern-
ment.21 Instead, they were attempting to overcome the impotence
of the Articles of Confederation while at the same time assuring
that there would remain no single source of power that would func-
tion as sovereign authority.
Moreover, according to Arendt, the founders learned from the
Romans that while power resides in the people, authority resides in
the Senate. This strategic division was made even more effective
by Hamilton. He completely separated power from authority, the
popular will from judicial wisdom, by investing "the majesty of na-
tional authority" in the Supreme Court, an institution that had
"neither force nor Will," in Hamilton's words, and was therefore
the "weakest" of the three branches of government.22
19 Id. at 140-41.
20 Id. at 146.
21 Id. at 151.
22 Id. 200-01.
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Arendt marvels at all these devices that emerged from the
Constitutional Convention. She recognizes that they had anteced-
ents in both classical antiquity and the modern Enlightenment.
Yet the American Constitution represented a profound break-
through in western political philosophy. "In this respect, the great
and, in the long run, perhaps the greatest American innovation in
politics as such was the consistent abolition of sovereignty within
the body politic of the republic, the insight that in the realm of
human affairs sovereignty and tyranny are the same."" s
Charles Beard also recognized that the framers had success-
fully abolished the idea of sovereignty in the Constitution, but he
interpreted their reasons for doing so entirely differently. He
quoted Madison's Federalist 10 to show why the framers feared
sovereignty as the will of the majority acting in concert-Arendt's
definition of power. "Whilst all authority in it will be derived from
and dependent on the society," Madison wrote in reference to the
new republic, "the society itself will be broken into so many parts,
interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or
of the minority, will be in little danger from the interested combi-
nation of the majority. ' 24 To Beard, such a scheme could only
mean that the activity of popular majorities would be frustrated
while the activity of economic interests that move under the sanc-
tity of law would be protected:
If we examine carefully the delicate instrument by which the
framers sought to check certain kinds of positive action that
might be advocated to the detriment of established and ac-
quired rights, we cannot help marvelling at their skill. Their
leading idea was to break up the attacking forces at the start-
ing point: the source of political authority for the several
branches of government. This disintegration of positive action
at the source was further facilitated by the differentiation in
the terms given to the respective departments of the govern-
ment. And the crowning counterweight to "an interested and
over-bearing majority," as Madison phrased it, was secured in
the peculiar position assigned to the judiciary, and the use of
the sanctity and mystery of the law as a foil to democratic
attacks.25
Both Arendt and Beard perceived that the Constitution had
23 Id. at 152.
24 Federalist 51, in The Federalist Papers at 320, 324 (cited in note 4).
" Beard, Economic Interpretation at 161 (cited in note 1).
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abolished the idea of sovereignty. The former believed the framers
did so because they feared tyranny, the latter because they feared
democracy. A thinker like John Adams, who coined the phrase
"democratic despotism" a half century before Tocqueville, would
most likely have seen no distinction between tyranny and democ-
racy. It should also be noted that among the most original contri-
butions of the framers was not only their abolishing sovereignty
but their role as the first philosophers in western political thought
to identify liberty with diversity. Whereas Rousseau had identified
liberty with the unanimity of the "general will," Madison and Ad-
ams denied that all power could be invested in a single entity such
as a national assembly that presumably would represent all the
people. Whereas the entire classical tradition, extending from Aris-
totle to Machiavelli to Montesquieu, had insisted that the purpose
of politics was to transcend the differences among interest groups,
the Federalists recognized those differences as permanent, natural,
and unalterable. "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire," advised
Madison in Federalist 10, "an aliment without which it instantly
expires. ' 26 Adams in particular would have had difficulty under-
standing what Arendt meant when she claimed that the framers
saw the lower house of Congress as the springboard of power and
the Senate as the source of authority. Adams viewed the "rich,
well-born, and able" as just as exploitive as any other group, and
thus they were to be isolated (the tactic of "ostracism") in the up-
per house so they could not prey upon the less able members of the
lower. Adams did not juxtapose authority to power but power to
power.
Arendt remained convinced emphatically, and Beard implic-
itly, that the Constitution had sapped the emancipatory spirit of
the Revolution that supposedly manifested itself during the period
of the Articles of Confederation. Arendt in particular assumed that
mass democratic participation prevailed during and after the
Revolution. It was only with the coming of the Constitution and
the new Republic that Americans lost sight of the public space
necessary for the continuous exercise of freedom, those qualities of
deliberation and action that had been required for the construction
of government itself. Equating the faculty of human freedom with
the ability to begin and inaugurate, Arendt observed in small,
spontaneous revolutionary activity the area in which the public
realm is founded as human beings interact with one another and
2 Federalist 10, in The Federalist Papers at 78 (cited in note 4).
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accept the authority of the founding. She believed she could see
this phenomenon taking place in America's town meetings in 1775,
in Russia's councils and soviets in 1917, and in Hungary's rite in
1956. But the spirit of the American Revolution failed to find its
appropriate institution in the Constitution, which was more con-
cerned, as Beard had emphasized earlier, with protecting private
interest rather than promoting the public good, with controlling
democracy rather than expressing it.
A student of Max Weber might point out to Arendt and her
followers that a revolution is by nature a "movement" that sooner
or later must yield to the necessity of organization and control. Yet
Arendt believed that she had found in Jefferson's teachings the
formula for revolutionary revitalization. Unlike the framers of the
Constitution, Jefferson was not troubled by the Shays uprising.
Like Thomas Paine, Jefferson believed America had the power "to
begin the world over again," and the Shaysites were merely assur-
ing that the Revolution could be repeated in action so that its sig-
nificance would not be lost to memory. "God forbid," Jefferson ex-
claimed, "we should ever be twenty years without such a
rebellion."2 Jefferson's and Paine's conviction that the tree of lib-
erty must be periodically "bathed" in the blood of rebellion, that
the earth belongs to the living, and that each generation is sover-
eign and cannot be governed by the dead hand of the past seemed
evidence to Arendt that America had found the key to permanent
revolutionary struggle. She was particularly impressed with Jeffer-
son's citation to Cato's injunction: "divide the country into wards."
She acknowledges that there is no mention of the ward system in
any of Jefferson's formal writings or speeches. Nevertheless, from a
smattering of private letters Arendt believes she can establish Jef-
ferson as the philosopher of freedom identified as a continuous re-
enactment of the founding at the most local level of political
activity:
Jefferson himself knew well enough that what he proposed as
the "salvation of the republic" actually was the salvation of
the revolutionary spirit through the republic. His expositions
of the ward system always began with a reminder of how "the
vigor given to our revolution in its commencement" was due
to the "little republics," how they had "thrown the whole na-
tion into energetic action," and how, at a later occasion, he
had felt "the foundations of government shaken under [his]
27 Arendt, On Revolution at 236 (cited in note 15).
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feet by the New England townships," "the energy of this or-
ganization" being so great that "there was not an individual in
the States whose body was not thrown with all its momentum
into action." Hence, he expected the wards to permit the citi-
zens to continue to do what they had been able to do during
the years of revolution, namely, to act on their own and thus
to participate in public business as it was being transacted
from day to day. By virtue of the Constitution, the public bus-
iness of the nation as a whole had been transferred to Wash-
ington and was being transacted by the federal government, of
which Jefferson still thought as "the foreign branch" of the
republic, whose domestic affairs were taken care of by the
state governments.28
Having identified politics as the only realm of freedom, and having
defined freedom as a quality found only in action, and public ac-
tion at that, Arendt proceeds to assess the validity of Jefferson's
teachings on the basis of what he conveyed privately in correspon-
dence. Arendt fails to distinguish Jefferson the philosopher from
Jefferson the Statesman, man of thought from man of action. The
philosopher, it is true, wanted to preserve the values of rural life
and to continue the ward system in the name of Republican sim-
plicity, restrict the power of the national government in the inter-
est of human liberty, and uphold the principle of state sovereignty
as the best guardian of the will of the majority. The philosopher
also distrusted the power of the executive and Supreme Court, and
he called for a reduction in taxes and elimination of the tariff and
the Bank of the United States. Jefferson the President, however,
violated his own principles in allowing the old Federalist banking
system to remain and the debt to increase, in failing to revise the
Judiciary Act, and most of all in negotiating the Louisiana
Purchase with the advice and consent of neither Congress nor the
states-a move that boldly expanded executive power, negated the
philosopher's own strict construction of the Constitution, and as-
sured that America would be a large, continental empire in which
the precious little ward system would be more irrelevant than
ever.
29
Aside from the disparity between Jeffersonian theory and
practice, there remains a utopian assumption at the basis of both
2$ Id. at 254.
29 Still the greatest scholar on this subject is Henry Adams. See his magisterial History
of the United States of America During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson (1889-91).
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Arendt's conviction that the Constitution thwarted the spontane-
ous spirit of the Revolution and Beard's conviction that the Con-
stitution deflected the emancipatory ethos of the Declaration. That
is the assumption that the anti-Federalists, Jeffersonians, followers
of Paine and Shays, and others who supposedly held out for an
"elementary Republic" were more democratic and egalitarian,
more disposed to participate in civic activity, and more dedicated
to the public good. Yet we know, thanks to the research of Cecelia
Kenyon, that the anti-Federalists themselves were "men of little
faith," that it was the opponents of ratification who were so dis-
trustful of fellow man that they believed the Constitution needed
more, not fewer, checks in order to control the power of the central
government."
What, then, of local government? It is here, in the state legis-
latures and town meetings, that Arendt claimed to have seen the
flowering of agrarian populism and participatory democracy. Yet
those who wanted to preserve the Articles of Confederation were
not necessarily pining for the intimacy of local wards and commu-
nity politics. They feared the consolidation of power in the central
government as a threat to their economic well-being. The anti-Fed-
eralists, to be sure, worried about executive corruption and usurpa-
tion, and many doubted that the Constitution's mosaic of checks
and balances would render power safe and leave secure republican
forms of government in the states. And no doubt their lasting con-
tribution to America's political culture was their insistence that
the Constitution include a Bill of Rights.
But that demand had more to do with preserving what Isaiah
Berlin has called "negative" liberty, rather than "positive" lib-
erty.31 The anti-Federalists were less interested in securing the
ability to participate in government than in the power to resist it.
What they wanted to resist would surely warm the cockles of Ron-
ald Reagan's heart. "I know there are politicians who believe you
should be loaded with taxes, in order to make you more industri-
ous," wrote the pseudonymous "Cato." "[B]ut it is an erroneous
principle. For what can inspire you with industry if the greatest
measure of your labor are to be swallowed up in taxes? 3 2 Even the
30 Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Rep-
resentative Government, 12 Win. & Mary Q. 3, 42-43 (1955).
Si Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 118-72 (1969).
32 W.B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd, eds., The Essential Antifederalists 159, 163 (1985).
For another view denying that the opponents of the Constitution were classical republicans
devoted to civic virtue and the public good, see Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federal-
ists Were For (1981).
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Virginian anti-Federalists who demanded the Bill of Rights,
George Mason and Patrick Henry, feared the new Constitution
would allow the North to predominate and threaten not only state
sovereignty but black slavery.
In the supplanting of the Constitution with local wards, Ar-
endt believed she could find the basis of freedom in a polity that
had only solved the problem of power. "The basic assumption of
the ward system, whether Jefferson knew it or not, was that no one
could be called happy without his share in public happiness, that
no one could be called free without his experience in public free-
dom, and that no one could be called either happy or free without
participating, and having a share, in public power." 3 Actually
there is no mention of the "public" at all in Jefferson's discussion
of wards. "Every State again is divided into counties, each to take
care of what lies within its local bounds; each county again into
townships or wards, to manage minuter details; and every ward
into farms, to be governed each by its individual proprietor. Were
we directed from Washington when to sow, and when to reap, we
should soon want bread. '3 4 Instead of defining freedom as the abil-
ity to participate in the noble life of politics, Jefferson identified it
as the autonomous individual growing his own crops and managing
his own affairs.
Ironically, Arendt's definition of freedom as having its birth in
the spontaneity of local, collective activity was precisely what the
Federalist authors sought to suppress. Hamilton and Madison be-
lieved that the "tempestuous" disturbances and "convulsions" in
certain state legislatures made a new Constitution all the more ur-
gent. 3 They assumed that they could secure liberty not only by
institutionalizing political power but also by controlling class con-
flict. It is the genius of Louis Hartz that showed us why the fram-
ers were right for the wrong reasons and why they gave us a Con-
stitution that worked despite their misguided intentions.3 6
Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America represents the last
successful attempt to write a synthesis of American history in or-
der to establish the foundations of America's political culture.
Much of Hartz's analysis derives from Tocqueville's insight that
Americans were "born equal" and did not have to struggle against
" Arendt, On Revolution at 258-259 (cited in note 15).
3, H. A. Washington, ed., 1 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 82 (1853).
" Federalist 21, in The Federalist Papers at 138, 140 (cited in note 4).
58 The following account is more fully developed in my essay, Knowledge and Sorrow
Louis Hartz's Quarrel With American History, -- Pol.Theory - (forthcoming).
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class structure to become so. Starting from that premise, Hartz of-
fers a two-fold explanation to account for the enduring ethos of
liberalism: the absence of feudalism and the presence of Lockean-
ism. The first condition meant that America had no aristocracy
that as a class would have resisted social change, denigrated the
value of labor, and ridiculed the idea of equality. The second con-
dition meant that Americans would be property conscious, value
individual natural rights even if they were more sensed than un-
derstood, and regard liberty as consisting more in resistance to au-
thority than in the classical duty of participating actively in the
workings of government. Such conditions produced a mentality
that precluded the possibility that America would have either a
reactionary aristocracy or a. revolutionary working class. America,
in short, was and will always be different, unique, anoma-
lous-what the Old Left used to call the problem of
"exceptionalism."
Two awkward realities confronted Hartz. For one thing, except
for Tocqueville, few thinkers could be cited to support his thesis.
Neoclassical scholars like Arendt were more fond of finding ana-
logues to America in the Old World, even in classical antiquity;
and Beard, according to Hartz, was so caught up in European class
categories that he failed to explain America to itself. But the sec-
ond reality facing Hartz was even more embarrassing. If liberalism
was the underlying theme of America, why did not the framers see
it? Or, to be more precise, why did they glimpse it and then lose
sight of it?
The first two chapters of The Liberal Tradition deal with the
Revolution and Constitution. Ironically, in the first episode Ameri-
can political thinkers saw their country as an exceptional experi-
ence and in the second as a general phenomenon. Hartz quotes
John and Samuel Adams, Gouverneur Morris, and others to convey
the conviction that the Revolution of 1776 was unique and incapa-
ble of being emulated by France and the Old World. Among its
unique properties was the combined fact that America did not
have to "endure a democratic revolution"' 7 (Tocqueville's expres-
sion), had the church as an ally and hence had no need to develop
a political religion A la Rousseau,38 enjoyed an environment in
which long-known material satisfactions outweighed the momen-
tary political grievances with England,39 escaped the need to cen-
'7 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America 38 (1955).
Id. at 40-41.
39 Id. at 47-48.
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tralize political authority since there was no ancien regime to de-
stroy,-0 and managed to pull it all off without the appearance of
the great legislator, the "classical giant," whose traditional role of
showing up at the right moment to lay the foundations of political
freedom could be by-passed since the foundations had been lain at
the dawn of colonial life.," The American Revolution also produced
a "victorious middle class" that was not class conscious since, un-
like the French bourgeoisie, it did not have to struggle to overcome
such feudal residues as guild restriction and parasitical privileges.
As a result, Americans felt no need to establish physiocratic con-
trols over the economy. Instead they became Lockeans, not in the
intellectual sense that each and every American had read the phi-
losopher's political treatises, but in the cultural sense of remaining
distrustful of all authority that did not come from themselves, val-
uing natural rights and the rewards of labor, and being convinced
that the power of the state must be limited. Clearly, the "pursuit
of happiness" had a private connotation and not, as Arendt in-
sisted, a "public" meaning. Taken directly from Locke, it implied
for Jefferson the right to enjoy family and farm and through pro-
ductive activity improve one's property free of the encroachments
of state and society. 2
Yet while the revolutionary experience may have depicted
America as free from European social categories and political theo-
ries, the Constitution represented, to Hartz's dismay, a return to
Old World modes of thought. In part, this reversal of perspectives
resulted from the class tensions that broke out in Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and elsewhere during the post-revolutionary "criti-
cal era" (1783-87). With popular protests against foreclosures and
demands that state legislatures issue stay laws and inflated cur-
rency to protect indebted farmers, it seemed that the American
revolution had indeed a volatile social content. Some Americans
began to look upon Daniel Shays' uprising as the prototype of
Gracchus Babeuf's movement in France, an assault not only on ar-
istocracy but on wealth, property, and all social distinctions that
separated man from fellow man. Ignoring Charles Pickney's warn-
ing that America was not Europe, Federalists such as Madison and
John Adams adopted "a Hobbesian view of man" and wrote of
human nature as though it were a universal constant, saw the spec-
tre of "aristocrats" and "levellers" everywhere and assumed they
4 Id. at 43-44.
41 Id. at 46-47.
42 Id. at 49-53.
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posed a threat to the few.43 Thus, they went to Philadelphia to
write a Constitution for a society seething with class conflict. The
class fears of the Federalists left Hartz as amused as he was ap-
palled. "The Founding Fathers devised a scheme to deal with con-
flict that could only survive in a land of solidarity. The truth is,
their conclusions were 'right' only because their premises were
wrong."
4 4
Hartz' thesis that the framers were thinking about class-rid-
den European society when they drafted the Constitution and, as a
result, the new federal system of government "worked" not be-
cause of the ideas that went into it but rather because of the unan-
ticipated, stable environment which nurtured it, is a thesis a Toc-
quevillian could endorse. More than a century earlier the French
thinker saw that the "mixed" form of government that the framers
devised to contain conflict could scarcely have succeeded had con-
flicting class divisions truly existed in America.45 As did Toc-
queville, Hartz insisted that America was held together not by its
political institutions but by its widely shared values and moeurs,
the emotional "habits of the heart" that had no basis in the ra-
tional political designs of 1787. It should be recalled that the fram-
ers remained convinced that they could neither eliminate conflict
nor establish consensus. Because society itself was the problem,
they assumed it was more important to erect enduring political
structures than to teach citizens proper political behavior. Since
attitudes could not be changed, institutions must be well-
grounded.
Beard shared the framers' assumption that the spectre of class
conflict haunted the Philadelphia convention, and Arendt insisted
that politics and public virtue offered the only answer to the social
conflicts in the New World as well as the Old. Where others saw
conflict, Hartz and Tocqueville saw consensus, and in their liberal
analysis the Constitution is the result, not the cause, of whatever
stability and success America has enjoyed.
4' Id. at 78-79.
44 Id. at 86.
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